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BOOKS REVIEWED
THE THINGS WE DO FOR LOVE: JOHN HINCKLEY'S TRIAL
AND THE FUTURE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS
A Review of THE INSANITY DEFENSE AND THE TRIAL OF JOHN W. HINCK-
LEY, JR. By Lincoln Caplan. Boston, Massachusetts: David R. Godine,
1984. Pp. 135.
Reviewed by Michael L. Perlin*
Once a generation, a court proceeding (usually, but not always, a
criminal trial) captures and consumes the hearts and minds of the
American public. The distinctly non-majoritarian branch-the judici-
ary-is scrutinized through the refractory lens of public opinion (and
its sometimes-doppelganger, the mass media's perceptions of public
opinion). Whether the verdict is consistent with public opinion or
whether the public is outraged, the mere fact of the decision or trial
will compel changes-procedural and/or substantive-in the area in
question.
Such a trial, of course, was the trial of John W. Hinckley, Jr.,
charged with the attempted assassination of President Reagan and the
attempted murders of three others,' committed in a vain effort to win
the heart of Jodie Foster, a young actress with whom Hinckley was
obsessed.2 The "loud and passionate" public debate that followed the
* Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School. A.B., 1966, Rutgers University;
J.D., 1969, Columbia University School of Law.
1. Pretrial rulings are reported in United States v. Hinckley, 525 F. Supp. 1342
(D.D.C. 1981), opinion clarified and reconsideration denied, 529 F. Supp. 520 (D.D.C.),
afl'd, 672 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
2. For the extent of Hinckley's obsession with Foster, see L. CAPLAN, THE INSANITY
DEFENSE AND THE TRIAL OF JOHN W. HINCKLEY, JP. 38-43, 72-78 (1984). The letter Hinck-
ley wrote to Foster on the day he shot the President speaks for itself:
3/30/81
12:45 P.M.
Dear Jodie,
There is a definite possibility that I will be killed in my attempt to get Reagan.
It is for this reason that I am writing you this letter now.
As you well know by now I love you very much. Over the past seven months
I've left you dozens of poems, letters and love messages in the faint hope that
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jury verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) 3 did not yield
ambiguous results: Eighty-three percent of respondents to an ABC
overnight poll thought "justice was not done."4 The most "celebrated",,
you could develop an interest in me. Although we talked on the phone a couple
of times I never had the nerve to simply approach you and introduce myself.
Besides my shyness, I honestly do not wish to bother you with my constant pres-
ence. I know that the many messages left at your door and in your mailbox were
a nuisance, but I felt it was the most painless way for me to express my love for
you.
I feel very good about the fact that you at least know my name and know
how I feel about you. And by hanging around your dormitory, I've come to real-
ize that I'm the topic of more than a little conversation, however full of ridicule
it may be. At least you know that I'll always love you.
Jodie, I would abandon this idea of getting Reagan in a second if I could
only win your heart and live out the rest of my life with you, whether it be in
total obscurity or whatever.
I will admit to you that the reason I'm going ahead with this attempt now is
because I just cannot wait any longer to impress you. I've got to do something
now to make you understand, in no uncertain terms, that I'm doing all of this for
your sake! By sacrificing my freedom and possibly my life, I hope to change your
mind about me. This letter is being written only an hour before I leave for the
Hilton Hotel. Jodie, I'm asking you to please look into your heart and at least
give me the chance, with this historical deed, to gain your respect and love.
I love you forever,
John Hinckley
Id. at 11-12.
Hinckley's obsession with Foster arose after he "happened upon" the movie Taxi
Driver in which Foster played a young prostitute whom the movie's protagonist attempts
to rescue. Id. at 10, The protagonist was played by Robert DeNiro. Id. at 76. Hinckley
saw Taxi Driver at least fifteen times. Id. The movie was also played at his trial as part
of the defense's case, id. at 88, and eventually Hinckley "cast himself" as Travis Bickle,
"a lonely, friendly, girlfriendless man." Id. at 76:
Travis met the child-prostitute Iris-played by Jodie Foster- befriended
her, saw her as oppressed by pimps, and vowed to rescue her; Hinckley saw
Jodie Foster as an innocent, trapped in society, a prisoner at Yale [where she
was a student], and he vowed to liberate her.
Id. at 77.
3. The insanity test used in "federal" cases in the District of Columbia at the time
was that of the American Law Institute's MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1962), as adopted
in United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc): A defendant is not
responsible for criminal conduct "if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental
disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality
[wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirement of the law."
Id. at 973. Because the Hinckley case was tried under the "federal" insanity rules, see
Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895), the government had the burden of disprov-
ing the defense beyond a reasonable doubt; had the court chosen to charge the jury
under the District of Columbia "local" rules on the 10 counts of the 13-count indictment
which did not charge federal crimes, the defense would have had the burden of proving
insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(j) (1981).
4. L. CAPLAN, supra note 2, at 116.
5. Id. at 20.
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insanity trial in American history had instantly become the most "out-
rageous" verdict. Separate streams of public opinion-outrage over
the courts' perceived "softness on crime"; outrage over an apparent in-
crease in crime; outrage over a jurisprudential system that could even
allow a defendant who shot the President in cold blood (on national
television) to plead "not guilty" (by any reason); outrage at a jurispru-
dential system that countenanced obfuscatory and confusing testimony
by competing teams of psychiatrists as to the proper characterization
of a defendant's mental illness; in short, outrage over the "abuse" of
the insanity defense7-became a river of fury after the NGRI verdict
was announced.8
Ironically, the most "celebrated" insanity defense pre-Hinckley involved a success-
ful presidential assassination: the murder of President James Garfield by Charles
Guiteau. Id. at 20. For a comprehensive account of the Guiteau trial, see C. ROSENBERG,
THE TRIAL OF THE ASSASSIN GUITEAU: PSYCHIATRY AND LAW IN THE GILDED AGE (1968).
Guiteau's insanity defense was rejected, and he was ultimately executed.
For an account of an even earlier use of the insanity defense in a trial following an
attempted presidential assassination, see Zonana, The First Presidential Assassination
Attempt, 12 BULL. Am. ACAD. PSYCH. & L. 309, 314-15 (1984) (trial of Richard Laurence
for assault on President Jackson; plaintiff found not guilty by reason of insanity after
five minutes of jury deliberation, and was ultimately hospitalized for 26 years until his
death).
6. The word "outrage" appears consistently in all accounts of responses to the Hinck-
ley verdict. See, e.g., I. KEiLrrz & J. FULTON, THE INSANITY DEFENSE AND ITS ALTERNA-
TIVES: A GUIDE FOR POLICYMAKERS 3 (1984); W. WINSLADE & J. Ross, THE INSANITY PLEA
182 (1983); Note, The Proposed Federal Insanity Defense: Should the Quality of Mercy
Suffer for the Sake of Safety?, 22 An. CRIM. L. REv. 49 (1984); Morse, In Defense of The
Insanity Defense, Los Angeles Times, June 23, 1982, pt. II, at 7, reprinted in Insanity
Defense In Federal Courts: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 243 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Insanity Hearings].
Of course, the use of the word "outrage" in this context is not new. See, e.g., M.
KAVANAGH, THE CRIMINAL AND H-is ALLIES 90 (1928), charging that, because "skillful
criminal lawyers" can turn insanity defense trials into "emotional disputes,... in cases
where insanity is presented as a defense, so many verdicts which outrage justice are
returned." Id. (emphasis added).
7. Cf. Moran, Preface, 477 ANNALS Am AcAD. POL. & SOC. SCL 9 (1985) [hereinafter
cited as ANNALS]:
The insanity defense is the most abused defense. No other defense has been
so denounced or so routinely criticized .... There has always been a perception
that the defense is peculiarly open to fraud and misrepresentation; that it has
been employed mainly as a last, desperate resort by guilty defendants; that it
allows the guilty to escape the stem hand of justice; and that it does not suffi-
ciently protect society from the wrath of criminal madmen.
Id.
8. The "swift and vociferous public outrage," L KEILrrz & J. FULTON, supra note 6, at
3, took many forms. A year after the verdict, Trial Judge Barrington Parker told the
Washington Post:
An appreciable amount of the correspondence was regrettably gross, insult-
ing and blatantly racial. The "black judge"-the "all black jury" (all but one),
1985]
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Congress, not surprisingly, listened. Within days of the verdict,
twenty-six different pieces of legislation to abolish or sharply curtail
the use of the insanity defense were introduced to "change the ground
rules."' 0 Although the Nixon Administration had been singularly un-
successful in its attempt to gut the defense less than a decade earlier,"
the notion that a would-be presidential assassin could "beat the rap"
by any means fueled the fires to such an extent that it was impossible
for the insanity defense to escape unscathed.
After the first roar of public opinion, however, most of the relevant
professional associations12 began to marshal their forces for a counter-
attack. Faced with a nearly united front presented by the American
and the location of the trial in a "black city" were all tied to "blacks'" known
dislike and hatred of Reagan.
L. CAPLAN, supra note 2, at 117. The irony, of course, is that Hinckley had toyed with
membership in the National Socialist Party (the American Nazis), and characterized
himself as "an all-out anti-Semite and white racialist." Id. at 35.
9. See, e.g., S.2745, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), reprinted in The Insanity Defense:
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 541-45 (1982)
(proposal to amend Title 18 of the Judiciary Code to eliminate mental condition as a
defense to any charge of criminal conduct). The bills that first received the Reagan Ad-
ministration's endorsement approached, but did not reach, the "pure" abolitionist posi-
tion; they would have made insanity a defense only where, as a result of mental disease
or defect, the defendant lacked the mens rea required as an element of the offense. For a
discussion of the subsequent shift by the Reagan Administration, see infra note 18.
10. L. CAPLAN, supra note 2, at 104.
11. See Rodriguez, LeWinn & Perlin, The Insanity Defense Under Siege: Legislative
Assaults and Legal Rejoinders, 14 RUTGERS L.J. 397, 398 n.2 (1983):
Ironically, the United States Congress has undertaken similar deliberations.
In 1975 and 1976, the United States Senate spent months debating a massive
criminal law reform omnibus bill which included a provision abolishing the in-
sanity defense. See S.1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). For a full analysis of the
relevant portions of the bill, see Wales, An Analysis of the Proposal to "Abol-
ish" the Insanity Defense in S.1: Squeezing a Lemon, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 687
(1976). That provision died in committee after extensive scrutiny and considera-
tion. See 34 CoNG. Q. 586 (Mar. 13, 1976); 33 CONG. Q. 2385 (Nov. 8, 1975).
Id. For the possible origins of former President Nixon's charges that the defense had
been subject to "unconscionable abuse by defendants," see Gerber, The Insanity De-
fense Revisited, 1984 ARiz. ST. L.J. 83, 117-18.
12. Only the American Medical Association recommended that the defense be
abolished:
[The insanity defense] has outlived its principal utility, it invites continuing ex-
pansion and corresponding abuse, it requires juries to decide cases on the basis
of criteria that defy intelligent resolution in the adversary forum of the court-
room, and it impedes efforts to provide needed treatment to mentally ill offend-
ers. As a result, it inspires public cynicism and contributes to erosion of confi-
dence in the law's rationality, fairness, and efficiency.
The Insanity Defense in Criminal Trials and Limitations of Psychiatric Testimony,
1983 A.MA REP. OF BD. OF TRUSTEES 32-33, reprinted in I. KEILITZ & J. FULTON, supra
note 6, at 41.
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Bar Association, 13 the American Psychiatric Association, 14 the ABA's
Standing Committee on Association Standards for Criminal Justice, 5
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,' 6
and the specially-created National Commission on the Insanity De-
fense,'7 the Reagan Administration quietly dropped its abolition cry,",
and agreed to support a "reform compromise."' 19
13. See, e.g., Reform of the Federal Insanity Defense: Hearings before the Subcomm.
on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 26
(1983) [hereinafter cited as Reform Hearings] (ABA Policy on the Insanity Defense).
14. See id. at 136 (American Psychiatric Association Statement on the Insanity
Defense).
15. See id. at 37 (ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards (First Tentative
Draft, Mar. 7, 1983)). These standards were ultimately adopted, with minor modifica-
tions, at the ABA's annual meeting in August 1984.
16. See MODEL INSANITY DEFENSE AND PosT-TRIuL DIsPOsrrIoN ACT § 201 comment
(1984).
17. Reform Hearings, supra note 13, at 90. See generally NATIONAL MENTAL HEALTH
Assoc., MYTHS & REALITIES: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE INSANITY
DEFENSE (1983) [hereinafter cited as MYTHS & REALITIES], stressing the degree to which
"the public, the legal profession and specifically legislators dramatically and grossly
overestimate both the frequency and the success rate of the plea." Id. at 15 (emphasis
added) (quoting testimony of Joseph H. Rodriguez, Public Advocate of the State of New
Jersey, made during the course of the Insanity Hearings, supra note 6, at 246).
18. The position change came in the footnote to supplemental testimony of a then
mid-level Justice Department bureaucrat. See Reform Hearings, supra note 13, at 255
n.1 (testimony of D. Lowell Jensen, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, De-
partment of Justice):
[O]ur review of the numerous bills that have been introduced and our recog-
nition of the apparent consensus that has developed for the approach of H.R.
1280-which reflects the position of the ABA and APA-have persuaded the
Administration that there is also substantial merit in this approach, and accord-
ingly to include this version of the insanity defense itself, in our draft bill.
Id.
19. Id. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat.
1840, as signed by President Reagan, included the following language:
(a) AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE.-It is an affirmative defense to a prosecu-
tion under any Federal statute that, at the time of the acts constituting the of-
fense, the defendant as a result of severe mental disease or defect, was unable to
appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts. Mental disease
or defect does not otherwise constitute a defense.
(b) BURDEN OF PROOF.-The defendant has the burden of proving the
defense of insanity by clear and convincing evidence.
Id. tit. II, § 402(a), 98 Stat. 1840, 2057 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 20).
In addition, the bill amended the Federal Rules of Evidence to curtail the scope of
expert evidence in insanity cases:
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), testimony in the form of an
opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it em-
braces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condi-
tion of a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to
whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition consti-
1985]
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That "reform" had the effect of returning the insanity defense in
federal jurisdictions to status quo ante 1843: the year of the celebrated
M'Naghten decision 20 which adopted the rigid, cognitive-only criminal
responsibility test,21 a test that dominated American criminal law for
more than a century.22 Interestingly, in the afterglow of the white light
of outrage left by the Hinckley verdict, this retreat-to a test charac-
terized three decades ago by the eminent psychiatrist Dr. Gregory
Zilboorg as "the impenetrable wall behind which sits entrenched the
almost inconquerable prosecutor; it is the monster of the earnest psy-
chiatrist which prevents him from introducing into the courtroom true
understanding of human psychology and the psychology of the crimi-
nal act" 23 -was considered a major tactical victory by proponents of
the defense.2'
tuting an element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate
issues are matters for the trier of fact alone.
FED. R. EVID. 704.
20. 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
21. Criticism of the M'Naghten test is legion. See, e.g., S. GLUECK, LAW AND PSYCHIA-
TRY: COLD WAR OR ENTENT CORDiALE 43-48 (Johns Hopkins ed. 1966) ("in actual admin-
istration, the tests of irresponsibility have had the rigidity of an army cot and the flexi-
bility of a Procrustean bed"); A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 233-34 n.3 (1967)
(collected criticisms); H. HUCKABEE, LAWYERS, PSYCHIATRISTS AND CRIMINAL LAW: COOPER-
ATION AND CHAOS 11 (1980); H. FINGARgrrE, THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL INSANITY 144-49
(1972). For a full account of the M'Naghten case, see R. MORAN, KNOWING RIGHT FROM
WRONG: THE INSANITY-DEFENSE OF DANIEL McNAuGHTAN (1981).
The NGRI verdict in the M'Naghten case inspired virtually the same sentiments as
did the Hinckley verdict nearly a century and a half later. "The public was alarmed by
the verdict. It felt unprotected from the wrath of madmen who they feared could now
kill with impunity." Id. at 19. Both the British press and Queen Victoria were similarly
disturbed by the verdict: The London Standard charged that "mad doctors" were per-
mitted to "dictate the law." The Standard, Mar. 9, 1843, at 1, quoted in R. MORAN,
supra, at 19. The Queen wondered why the law was of "no avail," since "everybody is
morally convinced that [the] malefactor... [was] perfectly conscious and aware of what
[he] did." Queen Victoria's Letters, Royal Archives RA 14/8, quoted in R. MORAN, supra,
at 20.
22.
The M'Naughten rule instructs the jury: that every man is to be presumed to be
sane, and ... that to establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be
clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused
was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to
know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or if he did know it, that he
did not know he was doing what was wrong.
A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 21, at 42 (quoting M'Naughten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843)).
For a historical background, see A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 21, at 1-96, 233 n.1.
23. G. ZILBOORG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL ACT AND PUNISHMENT 10 (1954).
24. See Milner, What's Old and New About the Insanity Plea, 67 JUDICATURE 499
(1984). Although the National Commission on the Insanity Defense was established as an
independent commission by the National Mental Health Association, the Association
was interested in maintaining the plea. The Commission carried out "a tactical retreat in
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Each of the major threads of this sag25 is considered, analyzed,
and ultimately intertwined in Lincoln Caplan's The Insanity Defense
and The Trial of John W. Hinckley, Jr. The book is simply the finest,
most penetrating, and most elegantly crafted single volume ever writ-
ten about the raw nerve at the cutting edge26 of law and psychiatry.
Caplan's position is clear: The legislative "rush to judgment"2 7
which followed the Hinckley acquittal was a "step toward tyranny.
28
It stemmed from a "misleading" 29 and "false" 30 choice that counte-
nanced "the erosion of liberty for the sake of security [thus]
threaten[ing] fundamental principles."31 The senators responsible for
the new legislation chose to interpose insanity defense "reform" as a
"surrogate for resolution of the most profound issues in criminal jus-
tice, and, between polar views about crime, punishment, and responsi-
bility, [they] chose to emphasize retribution":32
They may have gained the satisfaction of grappling with a
large issue. They may also have taken out on a narrow legal
problem the frustrations citizens feel with a disorderly, unman-
ageable, and daunting system, and, by voting to cut back the
insanity defense, shown a willingness to give up a civilized
standard for a harsh reminder of the balance of power between
the individual and society.2
3
the face of renewed pressure to abolish the insanity defense. It attempt[ed] to outflank
the abolitionists by redefining the problem." Id. at 505.
25. The trial of John Hinckley itself; the would-be assassin's "career" as a confused,
pathetic lover; the confusion as to the psychodynamic forces which impelled Hinckley to
act as he did (was he insane? grandiose? narcissistic? or did he suffer only from what
some reporters covering the trial labeled as "dementia suburbia"?); the "battle of the
experts"; the atypicality of the Hinckley trial; the significance of the responsibility test
used for "federal" cases in the District of Columbia and its scheme in the entire history
of the development of the insanity defense; the trial's impact on the public and Con-
gress; the myths and realities which surround all aspects of the insanity defense; the
passage of new "reform" legislation. See L. CAPLAN, supra note 2.
26. See Insanity Hearings, supra note 6, at 244 (Rodriguez testimony) ("[The Hinck-
ley trial] has put the spotlight on the insanity defense which is really the cutting edge so
far as society is concerned and the raw nerve of the intersection between the criminal
justice system and the mental health system."); see also Rodriguez Testifies on New
Jersey's Insanity Defense, 110 N.J.L.J. 453, 473 (1982) ("The insanity defense is the
cutting edge, or, perhaps more accurately, the raw nerve at the intersection between
criminal law and mental health systems.").
27. See MYTHS & REALrrEs, supra note 17, at 5.
28. L. CAPLAN, supra note 2, at 5.
29. Id. at 4.
30. Id. at 5.
31. Id. at 4.
32. Id. at 127.
33. Id.
19851
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In assessing the data that lead him-ineluctably-to this conclu-
sion, Caplan paints numerous deft and striking portraits of the partici-
pants in the trials4 and casts new light on the tortured tale of John
Hinckley's childhood.35 Caplan ably synthesizes the history of the com-
peting insanity defense tests" and cross-cuts with astonishing clarity
and precision throughout the Hinckley case: parallel developments in a
contemporaneous trial of an obscure defendant raising an insanity de-
fense; 7 the political maneuverings in the days following the verdict;38
the true issues of human behavior, responsibility, morality, and juris-
prudence raised by the insanity defense debate; 39 and the debate's
ramifications for the future of the Republic. 40 In each instance, Caplan
is persuasive and compelling,41 especially in his relentless pursuit of
the basic meretriciousness of the politically motivated abolition posi-
tion,42 as fronted by such Reagan Administration stalwarts as former
34. See, e.g., id. at 67 (describing defense witness Dr. William Carpenter as "a tall
man with a silvery beard and shoulder-length hair [who] folded into the witness stand
[and] resembled Father Time"); id. at 68 (describing prosecution witness Dr. Park Deitz
as "large and carefully groomed, [with] full cheeks and a quizzical brow. For whatever
reason, sketch artists at the trial stumbled over Deitz, and said they made him look evil
when they didn't mean to."); id. at 84 (describing defense witness Dr. David Bear, whose
"outburst had changed him from. .. 'the son-in-law every Jewish mother wants for her
daughter' . . . to a determined pedant, his furies unleashed").
35. Id. at 33-47.
36. Id. at 19-32. Prior to Hinckley, virtually all "infamous defendants," including
those who raised the insanity defense after attacking Robert Kennedy, Martin Luther
King, Jr., John Lennon, Gerald Ford, and George Wallace, were unsuccessful. Id. at 31-
32. "Hinckley broke the string, kindling a new trial of the insanity defense." Id. at 32.
37. Id. at 49-58.
38. Id. at 101-07.
39. Id. at 108-16.
40. Id. at 1-5, 125-27.
41. In the spirit of disclosure, the author must confess that one reason Caplan is so
"persuasive" is that Caplan's positions are not dissimilar to his. See, e.g., PERLIN, AFTER
HINCKLEY: OLD MYTHS, NEW REALITIES, AND THE FUTURE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE (5
Directions in Psychiatry, Lesson 22, 1985); Perlin & Sadoff, The Adversary System, in
VIOLENCE. PERSPECTIVES ON MURDER AND AGGRESSION 394 (1978); Perlin, Psychiatric
Testimony in a Criminal Setting, 3 BULL. AM. AcAD. PSYCH. & L. 143 (1975); Perlin,
Overview of Rights in the Criminal Process: Rights of the Mentally Handicapped in the
Criminal Process, in 3 LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 1879 (1979) [here-
inafter cited as Criminal Process Rights]; Perlin, Whose Plea is it Anyway? Insanity
Defense Myths and Realities, 79 PHILADELPHIA MED. 5 (1983); Rodriguez, LeWinn &
Perlin, supra note 11.
42. The motivations of the "law and order right" abolitionists often differ from the
motivations of the "academic left" abolitionists. See, e.g., T. SzAsz, LAw, LIBERTY AND
PSYCHIATRY 212 (1963); N. KrrrRE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT 398-404 (1973). See
generally Katz & Goldstein, Abolish The Insanity Defense-Why Not?, 72 YALE L.J.
853, 865 (1963). These motivations in turn differ from those of the "bureaucratic center,"
which views insanity acquittees as "political albatrosses" that thwart the hospital's deci-
sion-making autonomy; see Criminal Process Rights, supra note 41, at 1891.
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Attorney General William French Smith and current Attorney General
Edwin Meese.43 The "daunting-and hyperbolic-choice [thrown down
by the Attorney General] between liberty and security, between pro-
tection of the individual and protection of society,"' 44 Caplan argues, is
a false choice. He cites reams of uncontroverted evidence adduced at
the several congressional and special committee hearings45 flatly con-
tradicting the assumptions offered by the pro-abolitionists as revealed
truth.46 Caplan specifically refers to evidence showing that the insanity
defense is seldom used successfully in homicide cases: 47 After its suc-
cessful use, insanity acquittees are generally confined twice as long as
felons convicted of similar charges, 4 and their recidivism rate is lower
than that of convicted felons.49
The Administration's position can be interpreted in many ways. It
can be viewed as a simple reflection of overwhelming public opinion,
5 0
43. L. CAPLAN, supra note 2, at 3. Attorney General Smith told a Senate Committee
that "[m]odification of the insanity defense is a major element of the program needed to
restore the effectiveness of Federal law enforcement," The Insanity Defense: Hearings
before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1982) (emphasis
added) [hereinafter cited as Insanity Defense Hearings], and to "restore the balance
between the forces of law and the forces of lawlessness." Id. at 26.
44. L. CAPLAN, supra note 2, at 3.
45. See, e.g., Insanity Hearings, supra note 6; Reform Hearings, supra note 13; In-
sanity Defense Hearings, supra note 43. The National Commission on the Insanity De-
fense, see supra note 17, also held its own hearings. See MYTHS & REALrrms, supra note
17.
46. L. CAPLAN, supra note 2, at 110. A few days prior to the Hinckley shooting, Sena-
tor Orrin Hatch submitted a statement to the Congressional Record on his proposal to
abolish the insanity defense "without citing any statistics or detailed analyses." Id.
47. Id. at 102-04. A Justice Department survey revealed that in 1981 "only four fed-
eral defendants were acquitted of charges on the basis of a successful insanity defense."
Id. at 104. For statistical studies in support of Caplan's propositions on these points, see
Rodriguez, LeWinn & Perlin, supra note 11, at 400 nn.18-50. For the most recent up-
date, see Steadman, Empirical Research on the Insanity Defense, in ANNALS, supra note
7, at 58.
48. L. CAPLAN, supra note 2, at 104.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 116. It has been suggested that legislative fear of public outcry following an
infamous insanity acquittee's release is a significant factor in the shaping of such release
laws. See, e.g., Kirschner, Constitutional Standards for Release of the Civilly Commit-
ted and Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity: A Strict Scrutiny Analysis, 20 ARiz. L. REPv.
233, 276 n.380 (1978). See generally Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983) (insanity
acquittees are a "special class" subject to "an inference of continuing mental illness" and
dangerousness). For an analysis of Jones, suggesting that that case would discourage the
use of the insanity defense in the future, see Singer, The Aftermath of an Insanity Ac-
quittal: The Supreme Court's Recent Decision in Jones v. United States, in ANNALS,
supra note 7, at 114; for a full and comprehensive analysis of Jones, see Margulies, The
"Pandemonium Between the Mad and the Bad": Procedures for the Commitment and
Release of Insanity Acquittees After Jones v. United States, 36 RUTGERS L. REv. 793
(1984).
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as a cynical symbol "play[ing] on feelings of vengeance and fear,"'" or
as an attempt to push "our concerns about the failure of the whole
criminal justice system into the insanity defense. 5 2
In another context, the philosopher J.C. Flugel suggested over
twenty years ago that "our whole notion of justice is threatened when
we observe that a criminal has gone unpunished,' 53 thus disturbing our
moral and psychological equilibrium: In short, to maintain our entire
psychological and social structure, we must show the guilty party that
he "can't get away with it."' Viewing the insanity defense as "a power-
ful symbol, a scapegoat for the failures of the entire criminal justice
system,' 5 5 Senior Circuit Judge David L. Bazelon56 suggested that the
attack on the insanity defense "is not about criminal justice policy,"
but rather is "an attack on a way of thinking about crime and
criminals. '57 The attack reflected a "consciously fictional model of
human action. . . demand[ing] willful ignorance. . . [and] reject[ing]
individualization [that] is a prerequisite to a moral system of criminal
justice."58
Whichever analysis (or combination) is correct, Caplan's conclu-
sion is the same: The Justice Department's desire for a "show trial""0
led to a "sacrifice" of a verdict, 0 which, in turn, spurred "reform" leg-
51. L. CAPLAN, supra note 2, at 117.
52. Id. (quoting Dr. Loren Roth).
53. J. FLUGEL, MAN, MORALS AND SocIETY: A PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL STUDY 169-70 (1961).
Professor Flugel states that psychoanalysts recognize three main motives in the public's
attitude towards law-breakers and criminals: first, the criminal provides an outlet for our
(moralized) aggression; second, the criminal, by his flouting of law and moral rule, consti-
tutes a temptation to the id: "[tihis stirring of criminal impulses within ourselves calls
for an answering effort on the part of the super-ego, which can best achieve its object by
showing that 'crime doesn't pay' "; and third, our whole notion of justice is threatened
when we observe that a criminal has gone unpunished. Id.
54. Id. at 169.
55. Bazelon, The Insanity Defense: Symbol and Substance, Address to the 15th An-
nual Meeting of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law (Oct. 27, 1984).
56. Judge Bazelon was, of course, the architect of the famous (but now discarded)
opinion in Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1954) ("Our collective
conscience does not allow punishment where it cannot impose blame.") (quoting Hollo-
way v. United States, 148 F.2d 665, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1945)). It was Judge Bazelon who
"invited the world of mental health professionals and criminologists into his courtroom
and has extended his courtroom back into the world." Bazelon, Psychiatrists and the
Adversary Process, Sc. AM., June 1974, at 18.
57. Bazelon, supra note 55.
58. Id.
59. L. CAPLAN, supra note 2, at 125-26. The Justice Department had rejected the
terms of a plea bargain suggested by the defendant. (In exchange for a plea of guilty to
all counts of the indictment, defendant would be sentenced to concurrent prison terms
making him eligible for parole in 15 years.) Id.
60. Id. at 126.
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islation resting "on ideology more than fact."61 That legislation gives
up "a civilized standard [in exchange for] a harsh reminder of the bal-
ance of power between the individual and society. '6 2 Caplan insists
that the true sacrifice has been nothing less than the moral integrity of
the American criminal justice system.63
Although other scholarly commentators have found it "difficult to
fathom" how the insanity defense "can engender the profusion of
scholarly and popular literature that it has,"" and although an Arizona
Superior Court judge has recently characterized the on-going debate as
a "legal taffy-pull,"6 5 Caplan correctly perceives that the issues raised
go to the "core philosophical premise of criminal law" 6 6s-"[ft]he reality
of a 'significant' degree of free choice. '6 7 He knows that our ultimate
decision as to the future of the insanity defense will finally be viewed
in the context of nearly a millenium of recorded legal history. 8 Caplan
is well aware that attempts "to abolish or eviscerate the defense in an
61. Id.
62. Id. at 127.
63. While public outrage has focused on Hinckley's use of the insanity defense, there
has been virtually no attention paid to the remarkable ease with which Hinckley was
able to obtain a vast arsenal of guns for a period of two years prior to the shooting. See
id. at 35-40 (defendant purchased a .38 pistol in August 1979, a 6.5 caliber rifle in Janu-
ary 1980, two boxes of Devastators (exploding-head bullets) in June 1980, a .22 rifle in
1980, two .22 pistols in September 1980, two .22 pistols and two boxes of shells in No-
vember 1980, and a .38 revolver-the same type gun used by Mark Chapman to kill John
Lennon-in January 1981). Cf. Logan, Around City Hall: Notes From the Underground,
NEW YORKER, Jan. 28, 1985, at 72-79 (quoting Harvard Professor James Q. Wilson's
ironic comment that "so many liberals have been mugged that the [Bernard Hugo Goetz]
shooting didn't result in a single call for gun control").
Although other titles of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-473, 98 Stat. 1840, do call for mandatory penalties for the use of firearms in a federal
crime of violence, see, e.g., id. § 1005 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)), nothing in the
legislative history appears to correlate the passage of this title with the Hinckley shoot-
ing. See, e.g., Report of the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary on the Compre-
hensive Crime Control Act of 1983, S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 312-14 (1983).
64. I. KEmrrz & J. FULTON, supra note 6, at vii ("It is difficult to fathom how the
criminal defense of insanity, which is used so infrequently, can engender the profusion of
scholarly and popular literature that it has.").
65. R. GERBER, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 1 (1984).
66. D. HERMANN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE: PHILosoPHcAL, HISTORICAL AND LEGAL PER-
SPEcTIvES 3 (1983). "One leading American legal commentator identifjied] the core philo-
sophical premise of the criminal law as the assertion of 'the reality of a 'significant' de-
gree of free choice, and that is incompatible with the thesis that the conduct of normal
adults is merely a manifestation of imperious psychological necessity.'" Id. (quoting J.
HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 455 (1960)).
67. D. HERMANN, supra note 66, at 3 (quoting J. HALL, supra note 66, at 455).
68. The insanity defense has been extant since at least the twelfth century. For a
historical overview of the insanity defense, see Rodriguez, LeWinn & Perlin, supra note
11, at 406 n.56; Walker, The Insanity Defense Before 1800, in ANNALS, supra note 7, at
25.
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attempt to respond to . . . misconceptions would be shortsighted, un-
necessary and counterproductive."80
Caplan's position is neither radical nor impractical. It reflects hun-
dreds of years of experience based on Blackstone's basic premise that
"free will is the postulate of responsibility. '7 His position also reflects
the view that abolishing the insanity defense "would cut the criminal
law loose from its moorings of condemnation for moral failure. 7 1 As
Chief Judge Hornblower stated 130 years ago in the first reported in-
sanity defense case in New Jersey:
GOD and humanity forbid that it should ever be, that courts
should frown upon insanity as a defence, or that if a jury are
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, that the act complained of
was committed when the accused was insane, they should for
one moment hesitate in pronouncing a verdict of
acquittal .... 72
With this book, Lincoln Caplan casts his vote squarely on the side
of "God and humanity."
69. Rodriguez, LeWinn & Perlin, supra note 11, at 425.
70. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *20 ("All the several pleas and excuses, which
protect the committer of a forbidden act from the punishment which is otherwise an-
nexed thereto, may be reduced to this single consideration, the want or defect of will.").
71. Monahan, Abolish the Insanity Defense-Not Yet, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 719, 731
(1973) (quoting Livermore & Meehl, The Virtues of M'Noghten, 51 MINN. L. REV. 789,
797 (1967)).
72. State v. Spencer, 21 N.J.L. 196, 206 (Sup. Ct. 1846) (Hornblower, C.J.).
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